Page 5 - March April 24 CBA Report

KEEPING THE ‘PROCEED’ IN PROCEEDINGS
The Omnibus Clauses of 18 U.S.C. Sections 1503(a) and 1512(c)(2) By Patrick J. Hanley
In the Federal Criminal Code there are many obstruction of justice statutes1, the most prominent of which is the “omnibus clause” contained in 18 U.S.C. Section 1503(a), which proscribe acts that corruptly obstruct or interfere with the due administration of justice. However, another “omnibus clause” was passed by Congress in 2002 as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act2 and set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2) has become more popular with prosecutors. Instead of prohibiting corrupt obstructive acts involving judicial proceed-
or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”
Given that both of these provisions are broad catchall provi- sions5 that, in the case of Section 1503, proscribes all endeavors to obstruct the due administration of justice, and, in the case of Section 1512(c)(2) proscribes all forms of conduct constituting corrupt obstruction in “any official proceedings” not covered by Section 1512(c)(1), courts have placed “metes and bounds” on
ings, that section prohibits
obstructive acts relating to
any “official proceeding.”
Some believe that it “argu-
ably has the potential to be
regarded as the most expan-
sive legislative revision of the
obstruction of justice statutes
in the history of the statutory
scheme.”3 This article will
briefly examine both sections, noting similarities, differences, and their scope to provide an insight into obstruction of justice.
Section 1503 was first passed in 1948. Subsection (a) of that statute explicitly prohibits obstructing or interfering with federal jurors or court officials. It is then followed by the “omnibus clause” that serves as a catchall prohibiting all acts that corruptly obstruct the “due administration of justice.” Violators of that section shall be imprisoned for up to 10 years, fined, or both. The section has long been recognized as having the purpose “to protect not only the procedures of the criminal system but also the very goal of that system to achieve justice. ‘The statute is one of the most important laws ever adopted.’”4
18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2) provides that: “Whoever corruptly otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding,
the language of those provi- sions. The first of these is the so-called “nexus” require- ment that limits criminal liability to defendants who “have notice that [their] wrongful conduct will affect the administration of justice. A person who acts without notice that his conduct will affect an official proceeding,
after all, lacks the requisite intent to obstruct.”6 The charged conduct must have the “natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administrative of justice” or, in the case of Section 1512(c)(2), the official proceeding involved. This nexus require- ment was first made applicable in Section 1503 cases7 and then in Section 1512(c)(2) cases.8
Another limiting feature contained in the two statutes is the mens rea requirement that an individual must have acted “corruptly” to obstruct a judicial proceeding or any “official proceeding;” the act of obstruction must be accompanied by “corrupt” intent. The word “corruptly” is not defined in Sections 1503 or 1512; therefore it has been the subject of judicial inter- pretation. To act corruptly the Defendant must use unlawful means, or act with unlawful purpose, and act with consciousness
However, in recent years, another “omnibus clause” passed by Congress in 2002 as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2), has become more popular with prosecutors.
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